

Carbon pricing from a feminist perspective – a gender analysis

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At the beginning of 2021, a carbon pricing system was introduced in Germany on the fossil fuels coal, petrol, diesel, heating oil, and gas. The aim is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby contribute to achieving the climate goals. The level of the price, its effectiveness, and, above all, who will be particularly affected, and how the additional costs can be socially compensated are hotly debated in the political landscape.

In this paper, the effects of the carbon price and the various compensation proposals for private households/individuals will be presented and their effects on fairness and justice will be examined, especially from a gender perspective. This is not to reject the carbon price in principle; on the contrary, we consider it a reasonable instrument. But its implementation and the compensation measures should and must be critically examined and corrected.

We would have liked to examine the situation more from an intersectional perspective - unfortunately, the necessary is still lacking. Therefore, there is still 'room for improvement' in our analysis.

Part I: A brief introduction to carbon pricing, its intention and effect

At the end of April 2021, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the Climate Protection Act of the late 2019 to be partly unconstitutional. It restricts the civil liberties of younger generations by postponing radical climate protection measures to later generations. Just two months later, the German Bundestag passed an amendment to the law. The new reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions are now 65% by 2030, 88% by 2040, and climate neutrality is to be achieved by 2045.

A carbon pricing system was already adopted in 2019 as an important component of the Climate Protection Programme 2030 (BMU 2019). This means that in addition to European emissions trading, emissions trading at national levels will be introduced, as well. However, for the next few years, the prices for one tonne of carbon are determined by politics, rather than the market. In 2021, after much wrestling, the price was set at 25 € per tonne of carbon dioxide. By 2025 it is to rise gradually to 55 €, and for 2026 the price should get to a range between at least 55 € to a maximum of 65 €. Only from 2027 will supply and demand determine the price of pollution rights in the open market.

This means that fossil primary energy prices in the building and transport sectors will increase as follows from 2021:

	<i>carbon price (t carbon in €)</i>	<i>patrol (ct/l)</i>	<i>diesel (ct/l)</i>	<i>fuel oil (ct/l)</i>	<i>natural gas (ct/ 10 kWh)</i>
2021	25	7	7,9	7,9	6
2022	30	8,4	9,5	9,4	7
2023	35	9,9	11,1	11	8
2024	45	12,7	14,2	14,2	11
2025	55	15,5	17,4	17,3	13

Resource: <https://www.bmu.de/service/fragen-und-antworten-faq/fragen-und-antworten-zur-einfuehrung-der-co2-bepreisung-zum-1-januar-2021> (own translation)

The aim of the emissions price is to achieve a steering effect through higher prices for fossil fuels. The assumption behind this is that an increase in price will lead to lower consumption of primary energy and that more investments will be made in low-emission technologies.

By setting prices, reliability is to be signaled and predictability for all actors is to be established. And it is mentioned again and again that carbon pricing should be revenue-neutral and socially acceptable. We will see later whether this is the case.


All scientists agree that the real steering effect of the current carbon price is rather small. What is needed is that the price for greenhouse gas emissions should quickly come close to the actual costs of climate change impacts on us and future generations. According to the UBA (2020), the actual climate costs are 195 € t/carbon.

What does the increase in the price of fossil heating energy and fuels mean for consumers?

The (additional) costs per household are of course dependent on living space and car use. Rough estimates for 2021 assume an average of 10 € /month and household (Pötter 2021). A look at the burden by income group gives the impression that the distribution of the additional costs is fair: the lower income deciles have less living space, have a car less often at their disposal than the higher income deciles, and consequently pay the least extra cost. The higher the income, the higher the burden.


Additional costs due to the carbon price by income group (without compensation, at a price of 30 €/t carbon)

Burden in € / household and year



However, if the same data is presented as a percentage of household income, it becomes clear: the burden on rich households is lowest in relation to their income, while low-income households pay a significantly higher proportion of their income for the carbon price. Similar findings have been available for many years from the discussion on energy poverty.

Burden in % of of consumption expenditures



Resource for both graphs: <https://mcc-berlin.shinyapps.io/co2preisrechner/>

Compensation for the additional costs

It is estimated, that the state will collect about 7.4 billion euros from the carbon price in the first year. In order to take social justice into account, a scheme to compensate energy consumers for the additional expenditure was introduced, fed from the revenues of the carbon pricing. 60% of

the revenues will go to this scheme, namely to the energy and climate fund (among others, for electric mobility, replacement of oil heating systems, energy efficiency of buildings) as well as to the increase of the commuter allowance or mobility premium. 40% will be used to reduce the levy of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)¹ and thus to lower electricity prices.

In this way, the money is to flow back indirectly to the citizens: In the form of subsidies for the replacement of oil heating systems (to homeowners), for the construction of e-charging stations (to e-car owners), through a higher commuter allowance (to long-distance commuters) and for a stable electricity price (to all electricity users). A closer look shows that wealthier households benefit more from the subsidies than low-income households, which tend to own no houses and e-cars and commute less. The second part of the working paper will show how socially and, above all, gender-equitable the pricing and the various models are for compensating the burden.

Part 2: Effects of carbon pricing from a gender perspective

After the decision on the carbon price and its level, there was much criticism, especially concerning its social effects. As is often the case, the target group of women did not come up in this debate, neither did the question of possible effects on gender relations. The only exception was the frequently mentioned example of a female geriatric nurse who lives in an uninsulated house in the countryside and has to drive 25 km to the next town for her job. But she is a phantom. She does not exist, as we will see later.

The analysis of carbon pricing was undertaken along the gender dimensions that we developed as part of a research project on gender and climate (Spitzner et al. 2021).

Genderdimensions	Explanation
Care economy	Impact on the performance of domestic and care work (e.g. time, routines, energy and mobility needs)
Market driven, labour economy	Effects on jobs, working conditions, income and assets
Public resources and infrastructures	Access to and usability of public resources and infrastructure (space, mobility, services, etc.)
Shaping Power at actor’s level	Defining and shaping power of women and men in science, technology and politics
Body, health, intimacy	Comfort temperature, sensitivity to temperature changes, specific vulnerabilities (pregnancy, breastfeeding, sexual assault and violence)
Symbolic order (cross-cutting dimension)	Individual level: hierarchising bipolar attributions, gender stereotypes in discourses and narratives. Structural level: masculinity models as a benchmark, definition and perceptions of problems, understanding of tasks, etc. (androcentrism)


Effects of carbon pricing in the gender dimension: Market economy, income, wealth

Let us first take a look at some background data that are relevant for the assessment of carbon pricing from a gender perspective. First of all, there is a difference in income between women and men, which is also reflected in the gender pay gap. This is currently (2020) 18%. Much larger

¹ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Renewable_Energy_Sources_Act

is the gender pension gap, i.e. the difference in benefits for women's and men's own old-age provision, which was 49% in 2019.

This also becomes clear when looking at net incomes: In the income group with a net income below 1,500 €, the majority are women, while in all other income groups there are mostly men. As is well known, one of the reasons for this is that family care work is still primarily attributed to women, who therefore work more often part-time.



Resource: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/290399/umfrage/umfrage-in-deutschland-zum-einkommen-von-frauen-und-maennern/>

As a consequence 16.8% of women in Germany live below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold compared to 15.2% of men. The difference increases in the 65+ age group: 19.8% of women and 16.6% of men live below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. Most of those at risk of poverty, however, are found among single parents with 33.8%. The share of single mothers is 84.4%, of single fathers only 15.6% (Data Report 2021).

These differences in income and thus also in wealth influence the two sectors of heating and mobility which are subject to the carbon pricing scheme. On the one hand, in terms of the influence on the heating system: People with a lower income are less likely to be homeowners who can decide on their heating system (Data Report 2021). As a reminder, the compensation for the additional costs includes subsidies for the conversion from oil heating to a lower-emission heating system. This means that it presumably benefits the better-earning - mostly male - homeowners. However, the additional costs for heating energy is completely paid by the tenants² - the majority of whom are women³. Since even before the introduction of the carbon price, more than one fifth of all single parents felt that they suffer from a high burden of housing costs (ibid.), it can be assumed that without compensation this burden will increase. This is also suggested by a gender analysis of the housing situation in the city of Potsdam. It shows that the


² In the case of owner-occupied housing, this also applies to the users - but it can be assumed that they are not to be found in the lower income groups.

³ Data from 2011 indicate that 40% of men but only 27% of women own homes. <https://www.immowelt-group.com/presse/pressemitteilungenkontakt/immoweltde/2011/ungleichheit-frauen-weiterhin-seltener-im-wohneigentum/>

majority of those who spend less than 30% of their income on rent are male. In turn, the majority of women pay more than 30% of their income for their rent. For those people whose rental costs amount to more than 50% of their income, the gender difference is particularly striking: here, twice as many women are affected as men (Autonomes Frauenzentrum Potsdam e.V. 2020).

As mentioned above, the grand coalition passed a cabinet resolution in 2021 that the carbon price should be allocated half and half to owners and tenants, with the intention to create an incentive for owners to replace heating systems if they are still based on fossil-fuels. Yet, the housing industry lobby opposed strongly and was successful in convincing the conservative party CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union) to subsequently reject the regulation- to the detriment of the tenants.

Relationship between income and home ownership



Resource: Schumacher, Cludius 2021

Legend for the graph:

yellow: rent-free, green: tenants, light blue: flat owner, dark blue: house owner

Horizontal axis: income decils

However, the lower income of women has additional influence on the housing situation. First of all, it is obvious that the higher the income, the larger the living space. Thus, the higher income groups contribute massively to land and resource consumption, but also pay a higher carbon price. Conversely, it has a negative effect on the lower income groups that they more often live in buildings with poor energy standards. This concerns both the amount of heating energy required (insulation) and the type of heating (fuel).

For those who do the utility work and are therefore more often in part-time employment, this leads to longer periods of residence in the dwellings. Times during which the dwelling must be heated, which in turn increases the carbon price.

A similar situation can be seen when looking at the carbon price for fuel. Women own fewer cars, and if they do, then they own mostly smaller ones and drive fewer kilometers with them than men (Alber et al. 2018, BMVI, infas 2019). This is beneficial for the climate and also for their own wallets. But the cars of poorer households, in particular women with their lower incomes, are usually older vehicles. E-cars and the indirect compensation of the carbon price through the

promotion of the corresponding infrastructure, such as charging stations, in turn tend to benefit the better-off (men). Lower income citizens (women) cannot afford the significantly more expensive e-cars. A clear indication is provided by the sales figures of e-cars (see below and Frey & Röhr 2020). Here, as well, a bias of the compensation scheme in favor of higher income citizens becomes clear (Deutsche Bank Research 2021).

Finally, it should be noted that the intended steering effect of the carbon price, such as promotion of innovative technologies, improved energy efficiency in the building stock and new buildings, etc., will have an impact on existing and newly created jobs. This applies above all to technical and trade work areas in which the proportion of women is rather low. Here, efforts must continue to be made to achieve more gender parity, e.g. by designing working conditions in such a way that they are also attractive for women. At the same time, however, it must be ensured that the service, care, and education professions, which are not only relevant to climate protection but also systemically relevant, are better and, moreover, are also becoming more attractive for men. This leads directly to the next gender dimension.

Effects of carbon pricing in the gender dimension: Care economy, care work

The links between the dimensions of gainful employment and care work are obvious: the high proportion of women in part-time work goes hand in hand with the attribution of responsibility for care work to women. This also leads to intersections with the effects of carbon pricing. As mentioned above, the longer stay in the home due to care work may lead to higher heating costs – provided that the heating is turned down when the home is left. This should be a matter of course in the context of climate protection. Single parents are probably particularly affected here; unfortunately, there are no data available.

Mobility due to care work is also affected by the carbon pricing of fuels: Pick-up and drop-off services for children and relatives in need of care, as well as shopping services, will become more expensive. In contrast to journeys to work, there is no compensation here. Therefore, the additional costs have to be saved elsewhere, especially for low-income earners, which in turn can have an impact on housework and housework routines.

Effects of carbon pricing in the gender dimension: Body, Health, Intimacy

The physiologically determined higher comfort temperature and thus heating demand of women is highlighted in many studies (Röhr et al. 2018). This points to the fact that the increase in the price of heating due to carbon pricing can lead to an aggravation of energy poverty. This has also become a new social risk in Germany. Studies show that female-headed households are twice as likely to be affected by energy poverty as male-headed households, and point out that this is partly due to the high proportion of single mothers (Röhr et al. 2018: 42). Energy poverty makes people ill (Caritas 2016) and increases the likelihood of stigmatisation and social isolation. Experience from the UK and Spain shows that women suffering from energy poverty are twice as likely to suffer from physical and mental illnesses compared to women who do not suffer from energy poverty (EEB, WECF 2021).

Usually, medical statistics only distinguish between men and women, while non-binary persons do not appear even in (rather heterocentrically oriented) gender medicine. The health sector is not the only area where this marginalisation is noticeable.

Effects of carbon pricing in the gender dimension: Public resources and infrastructures

This gender dimension raises questions about non-discriminatory and income-independent access to energy and mobility services. It has already been pointed out several times that adequate heat supply is made more difficult by carbon pricing, and that this affects people with low incomes, single parents and pensioners in particular. The same applies to mobility, which arises in the context of care work. There is no discernible compensation for care related mobility in private households through the promotion of local public transport.

The topic of public resources also includes support and compensation programmes to mitigate the effects of the additional costs. Here, the implementation of the carbon price shows a clear gender bias. Many sectors of the economy are relieved by being reimbursed for the additional costs through so-called subsidies (see gender dimension Shaping Power). In the area of private households and especially in the area of care work, there is no corresponding relief. If the compensation benefits private individuals, these tend to be the higher earners (e-cars, long-distance commuters).

Effects of carbon pricing in the gender dimension: Shaping power

The unequal representation of women and men in decision-making positions in politics, science and business can have the consequence that the interests of the underrepresented, women, and also other socially marginalised (LGBTIQ, migrants, BIPOC, etc.), can hardly assert themselves.

This is particularly evident in the measures to compensate for the additional costs (see Part 3). The problem of the one-sided distribution of additional heating costs at the expense of tenants has already been mentioned (see Gender Dimension of Market Economy, page 4ff). In contrast, the "benefits" of 65 to 95%, through which many branches of industry are reimbursed for the additional costs incurred through carbon pricing, show who is more successful in lobbying (Carbon Leakage Ordinance). Even if these are linked to energy management and, from 2025, to the fact that 80% of the "benefits" are to be spent on climate protection if possible (Federal Government 2021), this makes the effect of carbon pricing seem questionable, at least in part.

The enforcement of the increase in the commuter allowance also reflects the interests of a certain group, the long-distance commuters (mostly male and high-income). Similarly, the "innovation bonuses" for the purchase of e-cars and the promotion of e-mobility infrastructures tend to benefit the target group of high earners.

Effects of carbon pricing in the gender dimension: Symbolic order

"Androcentrism" is when perception of problems and competences, processes, and resulting measures consciously or unconsciously take masculinity models as a yardstick. In the case of carbon pricing and compensation of the effects, the (exclusive) focus is on gainful employment. The entire sector of paid and unpaid care work and the effects of carbon pricing on this sector are completely ignored.

This also ignores the preferences, needs, and capacities of women and those who provide care work. The same applies to the situation that these people have less income/wealth at their disposal and thus have little chance to react to the carbon price, e.g. by moving into more energy-efficient but more expensive rental housing.

Interim conclusion from the gender analysis

The analysis along the gender dimensions has clearly shown that the carbon price and especially the compensation of additional costs are not gender-neutral. Basically, the gender analysis of carbon pricing shows that, when considering the category of gender, a further imbalance emerges in addition to the proven (negative) social effects. This is partly due to social inequalities, but also goes beyond them. The lack of a breakdown of the data by gender and other discrimination categories masks this imbalance and makes it difficult to address.

Negative effects are particularly evident among people with low incomes, especially single parents and pensioners. Whether and how other marginalised groups, such as migrants, BIPOC, LGBTIQ* etc. are affected differently or particularly, can be assumed, but not proven due to the lack of data. However, it can be assumed - and proven for energy poverty from research (e.g. Großmann et al. 2017) - that multiple discrimination, e.g. female, black and trans, can lead to significantly more negative effects.

It is positive that the social effects of carbon prices are recognised and addressed by politics and science, yet without labeling them as gender effects. Unfortunately, these findings are not taken into consideration for the implementation of carbon pricing, as will be shown in the following.

Part 3: Compensation models – assessment from a gender perspective

In the following section, we will take a closer look at the compensation and subsidy models that have already been mentioned in the analysis of the gender dimensions. Some of these are already being implemented: the commuter tax relief and the promotion of e-mobility, the climate dividend or climate premium is still under discussion. However, the current coalition negotiations (as of October 2021) and the new German government might also offer the chance to react directly to this.

"The potential government parties want to eliminate adverse social effects of climate protection in very different ways. They all want to abolish or reduce the EEG levy and replace it with tax financing. The CDU/CSU has pushed through the [increase in the] commuter tax relief and blocked the relief for tenants; they are not in favour of a climate dividend. This is demanded by the SPD, but it is controversial within the party and disappears behind the demands for a solution for tenants. The Greens are backing a climate dividend that pays money back directly - which is bureaucratically difficult. The FDP, on the other hand, calls for regulating all carbon costs in the long term via EU emissions trading - which experts calculate could lead to costs of over 250 € per tonne of carbon" (Pötter 2021).

The effectiveness of the models in terms of emissions reductions was not discussed here, because that would be a separate topic. Neither did we look at the reduction in electricity tariffs from a gender perspective. This would make electricity consumption cheaper - no matter how high it is, its steering effect is thus questionable. Since per capita electricity consumption does not differ significantly in the different income deciles, the effects are more likely to be found in the percentage of electricity expenditure measured against income. For low-income households, this share is 5%, for high-income households 1% (Öko-Institut 2021).

Climate dividend / energy bonus

- ▶ Per capita repayment (climate dividend, climate bonus, energy bonus)
- ▶ Every citizen receives the same amount (at the current carbon price approx. 75 €, with the possibility of increasing to 100-125 € p.a.).

With the climate dividend or energy money, the revenues from carbon pricing should be returned to all citizens as a per capita lump sum, regardless of age, income, or employment status. This is primarily intended to support people with low incomes who, due to smaller living spaces and less car use, emit less carbon than people with higher incomes. The Greens do not want this lump sum to be offset against transfer payments such as unemployment benefit II because otherwise it would not have the intended effect of compensating people with low incomes.

Academics criticise the concept of per-capita repayment because it is not targeted enough (everyone gets the same, regardless of need) and because so-called rebound effects can occur. This means that the money saved is used for more consumption and thus more carbon is emitted. However, given the rather small repayment amount, this seems to be a very unlikely construct. Moreover, the emissions of low-income earners are so much lower than those of high-income earners that it is better to think about this at the upper end of the income scale.

More problematic is the administrative burden of repayment, as there is no system in Germany that would allow this to be done easily for all citizens.

Against this background, alternative proposals are

1. compensation of low-income persons, e.g. via transfer payments, housing benefit, efficiency promotion. These would have the advantage of being more targeted to those really in need. At the same time, however, this is also their disadvantage, because it could lead to competition and thus acceptance problems: where does neediness begin, where does it end? This also raises the question of whether all those in need really receive transfer payments.
2. The second alternative takes up a concept that is already known from the ecological tax reform: the reduction of non-wage labor costs from revenues. And the major disadvantages – especially from a gender perspective – are also known from this: Only employed people benefit and especially many low-income people (pensioners, unemployed single parents, etc.) do not.

Commuter tax relief

- ▶ How is it compensated?
 - Above 20 kilometer of commuting distance, each additional kilometer is subsidised by 2.1 cents/km (this corresponds to an increase from 30 to 35 cents/km commuter allowance).
 - For low-income earners (below the basic allowance): mobility premium of 4.9 cents for commuting distances above 20 km.

As mentioned above, from the 20th kilometer of a household's commute distance, each additional kilometer to work – regardless of the means of transport and income – is subsidized. This subsidy exactly compensates for the increase in fuel prices for an average combustion car caused by the higher carbon price. From the 21st kilometer of commuting distance, there are thus no additional costs due to the carbon price. The scheme is in principle a continuation of the increase in the long-distance commuter allowance from 30 to 35 cents in 2021 and 38 cents in 2024 adopted in the 2019 climate package; however, in the climate package, the relief for long-distance commuters increases with rising income and marginal tax rate, resulting in a social imbalance. (MCC 2021, FIRM, FÖS. 2021)

The data suggest that the "uninsulated commuter" with oil heating, which is often quoted in politics, is very rare: "Even if the limit is set at 20 kilometers to work, this only affects around

120,000 households in the poorest fifth (...). For those who are particularly affected here, one could certainly develop a sensible hardship regulation." (Pötter 2021)

A look at the monthly net income shows the close connection between the level of income and the distance to work: the higher the income, the higher the proportion of long-distance commuters. Financially, one must also be able to afford to commute. The same applies to the level of education: better educated people are more likely to travel long distances to work. Full-time employees are also more likely to be long-distance commuters compared to part-time employees. Women with children are less likely to travel 25 kilometers or more to work than those without children. (Statistik kompakt NRW 2014)

Women tend to commute shorter distances. One reason for this is the gender-specific division of labour, which still attributes childcare and household chores to women. Therefore, female employees more often abstain from more distant workplaces and career advancement in favour of the family, while men more often accept longer journeys to work for their careers (DGB 2016). As a result, this shows: commuter allowances tend to benefit well-off (men).

Promotion of e-mobility (no direct compensation, mediated via the purchase of e-cars)

The subsidies for the purchase of e-cars do not directly compensate for the carbon price, but are rather part of the Corona stimulus package. Subsidies for privately used charging stations and the provision of charging infrastructure can also be found in the energy and climate fund, which is fed by the carbon pricing scheme.

- ▶ Funding is provided for
 - "Innovation premium" for the purchase of e-cars and plug-in hybrids (up to 10,000 € by the end of 2020, 9,000 € by the end of 2025)
 - Development of charging infrastructure and private charging points
 - Increase in company car allowance (private use of company cars)
- ▶ Who buys e-cars
 - The share of new purchases of E-cars by women is 27.6% (all cars: 36%)
 - The higher the price, the lower the share of women (Tesla: 14.8%)
 - 59.7% of all new e-cars are company vehicles (plug-in hybrids: 70%)

The proportion of women – men with company cars

	Professionals		Managers	
	f	m	f	m
Gross list price	28.908 €	36.896 €	42.792 €	52.074 €
Distribution	3,21%	12,12%	27,40%	49,33%

Resource: Frey, Röhr 2020


It is clear from this data that the promotion of e-mobility in its current form tends to be geared towards high-income earners (men) (Deutsche Bank Research 2021). However, it is actually those (women, but also small trade businesses) who need a car for shorter distances that can easily be covered with an e-car. E-cars for social institutions, such as outpatient care, are already receiving incentives. This programme makes sense and should be further expanded.

Conclusion from the evaluation of the compensation models

The German Öko-Institut⁴ has calculated the distributional effects of the various redistribution models introduced above. The graph shows that the two lower income deciles (tenths or 10% of the population) have a net benefit net from the combination of the models. The higher the income, the higher the additional expenditures – but even with a carbon price of 55 €/t carbon, the effect is still very moderate. It should be noted that the graph also includes a distribution of the additional costs for heat between tenants and landlords. Whether this will be introduced in the next legislative period depends on the composition of the future government coalition.

Distribution effects of carbon pricing with redistribution (2025, carbon price 55 €/t)

Legend for the graph:
green: relief thru reduction in energy prices, blue: carbon costs mobility, orange: carbon costs for heat landlords, light green: carbon costs for heat for flat owners, brown: carbon costs for heat for tenants, <> netto effect,
--- relief by per capita redistribution
Horizontal axis: income deciles, left: lowest income, right highest income



Quelle: Schumacher, Cludius 2021

From a gender perspective, and in terms of fairness it can be stated that the per-capita redistribution of revenues from the carbon pricing scheme is the most equitable solution. All other solutions tend to reward those who currently emit a lot of carbon, while those who emit little go largely empty-handed.

Perspectives for action

What can we (currently) do? In Germany, the coalition negotiations following the federal elections in September 2021 and the new government can offer the opportunity to respond to the results presented here. It is necessary to ensure that the issue of gender justice in climate policy is put on the agenda of the negotiations and agreements.

Fundamental demands that should be put on the agenda were developed in the research project "Interdependent gender aspects of climate policy" (Spitzner et al. 2020). The demands,

⁴ Institute for Applied Ecology, www.oeko.de/en/

which are currently being taken up and adapted by the gender working group of the Klima-Allianz Deutschland⁵ include among others:

- ▶ Anchoring gender in the climate protection law and in all programmes of measures
- ▶ Strengthen gender competence and expertise amongst in climate policy-makers
- ▶ Assess planned climate policies and measures for gender equality
- ▶ Take gender equality into account in the funding of climate protection and adaptation measures
- ▶ Orientate climate protection policy towards societal and social transformation.

⁵ Climate Alliance Germany is a broad societal alliance for climate protection. With more than 140 member organisations from the fields of environment, church, development, education, culture, health, consumer protection, women, youth and trade unions, it campaigns for an ambitious climate policy and a successful energy transition at local, national, European and international level (www.klima-allianz.de).

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